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# STUDY FINDS C.I.A. FAILED TO FULFILL SOME KEY TASKS

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WASHINGTON, June 6—An authoritative history of the Central Intelligence Agency released today holds that the agency has failed over the last three decades to fulfill several of its essential missions.

The study, prepared with the cooperation of the agency for the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, further concludes that the agency, over the years, became a bureaucracy that ran amok because of conflicting interests.

It says that the agency, despite its successes, especially in scientific and technical fields, was "distorted" very early by both its directors and their superiors, and moved away from its prime task of providing high quality intelligence analysis for the American political leadership.

## Others Share Blame

For example, the history notes that the agency had no estimate of Communist intentions in Korea before the North Korean attack on South Korea in 1950. It also notes that economic intelligence and international narcotics traffic intelligence were given priority only in the last decade and that attention to underdeveloped countries did not begin until the 1960's.

The history, which has been thoroughly read and declassified line for line by agency officials, also says the agency failed to become a truly "central" intelligence service coordinating all espionage resources of the United States.

The study blames a succession of Presidents, Congress, the armed services and the agency itself for the shortcomings. But its principal conclusion is that the C.I.A., because of its peculiar nature, was destined to develop controversial qualities.

The 95-page history was written by Anne Karalekas, a

young Harvard-trained historian.

It contains no shocking disclosures about individual aberrations or covert action disasters. But it does tell about rivalry in the American intelligence community, a lack of accountability to the executive and some peculiar priorities.

Miss Karalekas spent two months studying the agency's own histories, numbering 75 volumes, and eight months interviewing 60 present and former agency officials.

Her five-page conclusion says the agency "responded to rather than anticipated the force of change" over the last 30 years and "accumulated functions rather than redefining them."

"Its internal patterns were established early and have solidified," she said.

## Rivalries Persist

She further concludes that the agency never succeeded in overcoming rivalry from other intelligence services operated by the four armed service branches. The one man to blame for this, she says, was Allen W. Dulles, who directed the agency from 1953 to 1961.

The history suggests that the chief C.I.A. job, Director of Central Intelligence, involves too many tasks.

It says, giving evidence, that the agency was very early pointed in the direction of covert operations abroad at the expense of classical analytic intelligence work and that the agency "complicated" rather than minimized problems of duplication of intelligence. It says that, even after 30 years of operation, the agency remains an organization with sharp rivalries between its clandestine and analytical sections.

Finally, it says the agency's main product, its so-called national intelligence estimates, have largely gone unread by its intended consumers, including a succession of Presidents.

## 'Undirected' Development

Miss Karalekas writes that the evolution of the agency, which she describes as "undirected," was determined by four factors—the international environment as perceived by the Administration of President Truman, the milieu of intelligence institutions, the agency's structures and values and the personalities of the agency Directors.

In other terms, she said, this meant the growing cold war with the Soviet Union, the jealousy of the military intelligence services and the temptation for C.I.A. officials to seek spectacular "successes."

Miss Karalekas notes that at the end of World War II there was a predisposition among American policymakers to centralize the Government's many intelligence functions.

The reason, she writes, was the experience of the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941 by Japan when bits of intelligence gathered by one agency never reached other intelligence analysts who could have used them to predict the assault.

Miss Karalekas names Gen. William Donovan, the wartime head of the Office of Strategic Services; James V. Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy; President Truman and Ferdinand Eberstadt, an investment banker, as the founding spirits of the C.I.A.

But she notes that the Central Intelligence Group, the predecessor organization of the C.I.A. established in January, 1946, lacked money and personnel and was contested by the military services and the

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